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Forgetting across a hierarchy of episodic
representations
Nora Andermane1, Ba´rður H Joensen2,3 and Aidan J Horner1,4
Rich episodic experiences are represented in a hierarchical
manner across a diverse network of brain regions, and as such,
the way in which episodes are forgotten is likely to be similarly
diverse. Using novel experimental approaches and statistical
modelling, recent research has suggested that item-based
representations, such as ones related to the colour and shape
of an object, fragment over time, whereas higher-order event-
based representations may be forgotten in a more ‘holistic’
uniform manner. We propose a framework that reconciles
these findings, where complex episodes are represented in a
hierarchical manner, from individual items, to small-scale
events, to large-scale episodic narratives. Each level in the
hierarchy is represented in distinct brain regions, from the
perirhinal cortex, to posterior hippocampus, to anterior
hippocampus and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Critically,
forgetting may be underpinned by different mechanisms at
each level in the hierarchy, leading to different patterns of
behaviour.
Addresses
1Department of Psychology, University of York, York, UK
2 Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, UCL, London, UK
3 Institute of Neurology, UCL, London, UK
4York Biomedical Research Institute, University of York, York, UK
Corresponding authors:
Andermane, Nora (nora.andermane@york.ac.uk), Horner, Aidan J
(aidan.horner@york.ac.uk)
Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2021, 67:50–57
This review comes from a themed issue on Neurobiology of learning
and plasticity
Edited by Sheena Josselyn and Tara Keck
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.conb.2020.08.004
0959-4388/ã 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an
open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Episodic memory supports our ability to vividly recollect
past experiences. These experiences can be highly rich
and detailed in nature, containing both low-level percep-
tual and higher-order contextual and narrative details.
Given this complexity, it is unlikely that forgetting in
episodic memory is uniform in nature — different aspects
of an episode may be forgotten via different mechanisms
and at different rates. Research into forgetting has his-
torically focussed on the rate at which forgetting occurs
(see Ref. [1] for a review) or whether forgetting occurs via
interference or decay [2,3]. Recent research has begun to
tackle the key question of how episodic representations
change as a function of forgetting [4,5,6]. Building on
previous theoretical accounts [7–14], we propose that
episodic memories are represented in a hierarchical man-
ner across distinct brain regions and that forgetting at each
level in the hierarchy might be underpinned by different
mechanisms.
Holistic versus fragmented forgetting
Do episodic representations that support long-term mem-
ory fragment over time, such that some aspects of an
event are forgotten, whereas others are remembered, or
are they forgotten in a more ‘holistic’ manner? Imagine
yourself at your birthday party and your friend gives you a
present. Over time, your memory of this event will
inevitably change. One critical question is whether the
elements of this event (i.e. people, locations, and objects)
are forgotten independently (e.g. you may forget the
present you received, but still remember the person
and location), suggesting that the representation
‘fragments’ over time, or the elements are forgotten in
a dependent manner (e.g. if you forget the object, you are
also more likely to forget the person and location), sug-
gesting that the representation is forgotten in a ‘holistic’
manner.
There is evidence that event-based representations
involving multiple elements (i.e. people, locations, and
objects) tend to be retrieved and forgotten holistically
[15,16,17,5,18]. In these studies, ‘events’ containing
three elements (e.g. kitchen, Barack Obama, and hammer)
are encoded as three separate pairwise associations (e.g.
kitchen-Barack Obama, kitchen-hammer, and Barack Obama-
hammer). Participants’ memory for these events is then
tested by cueing one event element (e.g. kitchen) and
asking them to select the associated target (e.g. Barack
Obama) among foils of the same category. Across multiple
studies, statistical dependency was observed between the
retrieval of elements within an event. If you are cued with
the location and successfully retrieve the person, you are
also more likely to successfully retrieve the object when
cued with the location. This retrieval dependency is
similar to that observed when all three elements are
encoded on a single trial [15,16, cf. 19], suggesting that
encoding three separate, but overlapping, pairwise asso-
ciations can form an episodic representation similar to
that for events encoded on a single trial (see Ref. [17] for
fMRI evidence).
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Importantly, this measure of retrieval dependency can
also be used to infer whether mnemonic representations
fragment over time, or are forgotten holistically. If repre-
sentations fragment over time, such that some elements
are forgotten but not others, retrieval dependency should
decrease (Figure 1). However, if the whole representation
is forgotten, then dependency across events should
remain stable — either you remember the whole event
or you do not. Joensen et al. [5] recently provided
evidence in favour of holistic forgetting — although
people remembered fewer events following a delay,
retrieval dependency did not decrease. This result sug-
gests that even with the forgetting of some events over
time, those events that remain accessible are still
retrieved holistically.
These more recent results would seem to be at odds with
one previous study. Brady et al. [20] asked whether the
features of real-world objects, such as their colour, exem-
plar, or state (e.g. a closed or an open wardrobe) are
forgotten independently over time. Participants viewed
objects and at test selected the seen object among foils of
the same colour, state or exemplar after short and longer
delays. The authors observed independent forgetting for
object colour and state; accuracy for these two properties
was similar immediately after encoding but decreased
more rapidly over time for colour relative to state. Criti-
cally, retrieval dependency for the object state and exem-
plar decreased over time. Utochkin and Brady [21]
further showed that although retrieval accuracy for a
single object feature (e.g. exemplar or state) may be high,
people find it difficult to correctly match two features (e.g.
which object exemplar was in which state) after seeing
objects with different feature conjunctions. These find-
ings are in line with research by Cooper and Ritchey
[22] who asked participants to reconstruct the colour
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Holistic versus fragmented forgetting.
Representations with multiple elements or features can be forgotten in a holistic manner, with all elements being forgotten, or in a fragmented
manner, with some elements being forgotten while others are remembered. Both forms of forgetting result in decreases in retrieval accuracy
(Accuracy) between an immediate test (Immediate) and a delayed test (Delay). However, whereas retrieval dependency (Dependency) should
remain stable over time in the presence of holistic forgetting, it should decrease in the presence of fragmented forgetting. Evidence suggests that
event-based representations are forgotten in a holistic manner [5], whereas item-based representations may be forgotten in a more fragmented
manner [20].
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and location of objects previously seen within panoramic
scenes. The authors found that the gist of the features was
retrieved in a dependent manner, whereas the precision
of retrieval for each feature (i.e. resolution) was indepen-
dent. Thus, research suggests that precise perceptual
features of individual event elements may not be bound
within the same episodic representation and are therefore
more likely to fragment over time.
More recently, the fragmentation of object-based repre-
sentations has been challenged. Balaban et al. [4] inves-
tigated several object properties (e.g. exemplar, material,
colour, state, and orientation) across experiments that
manipulated the stimuli, encoding time, and learning
task (incidental or explicit). Participants encoded objects
and then selected the seen object among foils with
combinations of correct and incorrect features, immedi-
ately after encoding and after a delay. Participants con-
sistently remembered and forgot object features in a
holistic manner; retrieval of one feature was dependent
on that of another at both time points. Importantly, their
results also suggested a hierarchical dependence in object
representations, as retrieving the object exemplar was
possible without retrieving a lower-level feature (i.e. state
or colour), but it was not likely that a low-level feature
could be remembered without also retrieving the exem-
plar. Thus, the recent item-based findings [4] might be
reconciled with earlier work [20] if we consider that
independently represented object features fragment over
time, whereas hierarchically related object features may
be forgotten more holistically.
Item-based versus event-based forgetting
Behavioural studies have therefore provided evidence for
both holistic and fragmented forms of forgetting. Focus-
sing on the studies by Joensen et al. [5] and Brady et al.
[20], the results point to a possible dissociation between
event-based and item-based representations, respec-
tively. We propose that the way in which information
is originally encoded has a direct bearing on how it is
forgotten. In the case of object-based representations,
object features can be encoded in an independent manner
and therefore can be forgotten independently. Event-
based representations are encoded in a more dependent
manner and are therefore likely forgotten holistically.
Importantly, there is a large body of evidence suggesting
that item-based (e.g. object) and event-based representa-
tions are supported by different brain regions, with dif-
fering neural circuitry. It is possible that these anatomical
differences between event-based and item-based repre-
sentations underpin the behavioural differences in
retrieval dependency seen across these studies.
Whereas the perirhinal cortex (PRC), and the ventral
visual regions that project to PRC, are thought to support
the encoding and retrieval of item-based representations
[9,23–27], the hippocampus (HPC) is thought to support
event-based representations [28–31]. Critically, the pro-
cess of forgetting may be determined by the nature of the
neural representation probed [32,33]. For example,
research suggests that familiarity – a process supported
by PRC item-based representations – decreases as a
function of interference, whereas recollection – a process
supported by HPC event-based representations –
decreases via decay [34].
Importantly, the dissociation between item-based and
event-based representations is further supported by
differences in the underlying neurophysiology of the
PRC and HPC. Neocortical representations, such as
those in the PRC, are thought to be coded in a distrib-
uted manner [35,36], and the overlapping nature of
such representations may make them particularly sus-
ceptible to interference from related feature-specific
information (e.g. a similarly shaped object to the one in
memory). HPC representations are thought to be sparse
and non-overlapping in nature — due to the ability of
the dentate gyrus (DG) to pattern separate input from
the entorhinal cortex into non-overlapping orthogonal
neural codes [37–39]. These sparse representations may
be less susceptible to interference, relative to neocorti-
cal representations. Instead, forgetting may be more
likely to occur via decay [3,40]. For example, ongoing
neurogenesis, where new granule cells form and inte-
grate in the DG and CA3 [40], may alter existing HPC
circuitry such that more remote memory representa-
tions become less accessible over time, relative to more
recent ones.
Returning to fragmented versus holistic forgetting, can
the distinction between item-based and event-based
representations explain the divergent behavioural find-
ings discussed above? If items and their features are
represented in a distributed manner, their forgetting will
be dependent on subsequent feature-specific interfer-
ence. For example, if objects in many shades of blue,
but of distinct shapes, are encountered after seeing a blue
umbrella, this may induce greater interference in relation
to the umbrella’s colour, relative to shape. Conversely, if
similarly shaped objects (e.g. other umbrellas) of distinct
colours are seen, this is more likely to induce interference
in relation to the umbrella’s shape. Furthermore, these
intervening items may differentially affect the accessibil-
ity and precision of an item’s perceptual features, with
precision being more negatively affected by similar infor-
mation [6,41]. This interference could result from
encoding newly encountered items [41], or possibly
via internally generated reactivation of previously
encoded representations during the process of systems
consolidation [11,42]. Thus, the fragmentation of memory
for perceptual features of items, inferred from decreases
in retrieval dependency, may be driven by the nature of
the interfering material encountered (or re-activated)
after the initial encoding of the item.
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Hippocampal event-based representations, on the other
hand, may be more likely to show a holistic form of
forgetting. This is because the HPC is thought to bind
multiple elements of a given event into a coherent event-
based representation and retrieve these elements via the
process of pattern completion. Recent fMRI findings
have provided evidence for this hippocampal pattern
completion process in the retrieval of event ‘triplets’
consisting of locations, people and objects [17]. Subfield
CA3, with its recurrent connections, is thought to support
the pattern completion process [43,38,44], with recent
high-resolution fMRI evidence supporting this prediction
specifically in relation to episodic memory [45]. Pattern
completion allows for the retrieval of a complete memory
trace (pattern) given partial or ambiguous input. It sup-
ports the holistic retrieval that is thought to underpin
recollection — where a single cue can elicit the retrieval
of an entire previous event. Given the coherent nature of
HPC representations, it is possible that they are forgotten
relatively uniformly. Mnemonic decay may vary across
event-based representations, but be uniform within a
representation, such that some events are completely
forgotten, whereas others are remembered in their
entirety. Alternatively, although decay may not be uni-
form within an event, the process of pattern completion at
retrieval may continue to induce dependency at the
behavioural level — that is, remembering specific aspects
of an event may allow for the retrieval of its more weakly
associated elements.
What predictions does this item-based versus event-
based distinction make about forgetting? The first is that
item-based representations should predominantly show
fragmentation over time, whereas event-based represen-
tations should continue to show dependency in the
presence of forgetting. In relation to item-based repre-
sentations, fragmentation may be greater if interfering
material for one object property is experimentally manip-
ulated (e.g. interfering with colour but not shape). For
example, Sun et al. [41] varied the similarity between the
colour of working-memory items and intervening items,
and observed that presenting dissimilar colours led to
reduced memory accessibility for a particular colour
whereas colours of intermediate similarity lead to
decreases in memory precision. Note that there may be
specific situations where item-based representations do
not show fragmentation — such as when object-features
are hierarchically related to one another [4]. The second
prediction is that event-based representations should
continue to show dependency, even when overlapping
events are encoded (e.g. events in the same location) [46].
Note that it is possible that encoding new overlapping
events may induce forgetting of previously learnt
events via interference; however, the prediction is that
retrieval should continue to be all-or-none due to hippo-
campal pattern completion. In other words, even if hip-
pocampal event-based representations are susceptible to
interference from overlapping events, it will not result in
fragmented forgetting.
Forgetting across a hierarchy of episodic
representations
We have focussed on a distinction between items and
events, but episodic memories are more complex than
this. Returning to our earlier example of your birthday
party, it is likely that the entire episode contains multiple
smaller events in different locations with differing objects
and people. Thus, episodes typically consist of an over-
arching narrative linking together multiple related
events. We may play party games such as pass-the-parcel
in the living room, then play outside in the garden, then
sing happy birthday and eat cake in the kitchen. All three
‘events’ here are part of the same episodic narrative.
Previous experimental work has shown that these narra-
tive ‘core’ aspects of episodes are forgotten more slowly
than peripheral (e.g. perceptual) details [47]. Related
work on the forgetting of prose passages has also shown
differential rates of forgetting dependent on the nature of
the information tested (i.e. the exact phrasing of a sen-
tence versus the situation described) [48]. This is con-
sistent with multiple theoretical accounts [7,8,10,12] that
propose semanticised or gist-like representations, likely
supported by the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) [13,49,50], are more robust to forgetting than
contextually rich and detailed HPC-based memories.
Episodic memories are highly complex and hierarchical
in nature, with levels of representation ranging from
perceptual details of individual items to overarching
narratives, and as such, the nature (i.e. rate and coher-
ence) of forgetting may be dependent on which level of
the hierarchy we are examining.
Inspired by the research on episodic and autobiographical
memory [13,51,52] and event models and narrative structure
[48,53–55] we propose (at least) three distinct representa-
tional levels: items, events, and episodic narratives (Figure 2).
Our hierarchical proposal is consistent with recent models of
episodic and autobiographical memory [13,51,52]; however,
here we focus on how the different levels of representation
change as a function of forgetting. The lowest item-based
level is likelysupportedbythePRCandthe inputtingregions
in the ventral visual stream coding feature representations
such as colour and shape [23,26,27]. The event-based level is
likely supported by the HPC [17,28–31,45]. Research has
suggested that the longitudinal axis of the HPC may support
hierarchical representations,withposterior regions represent-
ing fine-grained local detail and anterior regions representing
more coarse, global information [56]. Recent multivariate
fMRI evidence supports this hierarchical prediction in rela-
tion to episodic narratives inferred from video-based episodic
events [57]. Thus, our episodic event and narrative levels
may map onto this posterior-anterior distinction, and the
broader posterior-medial anterior-temporal (PMAT)
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networks [58]. Smaller-scale memory networks involving
events from a single spatiotemporal context may be repre-
sented in posterior portions of HPC, whereas larger-scale
memorynetworkscomprisingnarrativesacross severalevents
mayberepresentedmoreanteriorly in the HPC,aswell as the
vmPFC [57,50,51].
Whether this proposed hierarchy has important implica-
tions for how forgetting occurs has not been explored.
The posterior and anterior HPC are known to differ in
relation to the relative size of their subfields and the
amount of neurogenesis [56,59,60]. These differences
may result in distinct behavioural patterns of forgetting.
Another outstanding question pertains to the effect of
encoding factors on the coherence of item-based
representations. With long encoding times (e.g. seconds
rather than milliseconds as in Refs. [4,20,21]), per-
ceptual details of objects are forgotten at a similar rate as
their categories [61], and scenes are retrieved in more
detail when encoded for longer [62]. Thus, well-encoded
item-based representations may also remain coherent for
longer. The representational hierarchy proposed here
provides connections between recently developed beha-
vioural measures of forgetting (in particular, retrieval
dependency) and the brain regions that likely drive these
patterns of holistic versus fragmented forgetting. Future
research should chart the time-dependent course of for-
getting for the proposed levels of this hierarchy and
explore how encoding factors, interference, and decay,
contribute to patterns of forgetting.
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Figure 2
pHPC LOC
PRC
aHPC
vmPFC
Episodic narrative
Episodic event
Items & features
The narrative of an episode, including
multiple sequential events across different
spatiotemporal contexts, is represented in
the anterior HPC and vmPFC.
The constituent elements (e.g. people,
locations, and objects) of events with a
single spatiotemporal context are bound
into coherent event representations in the
posterior HPC.
Individual items, such as objects, are
represented in the PRC and their individual
features (e.g. shape) are represented in
feature-specific regions in the ventral
visual stream (e.g. LOC).
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The hierarchical nature of episodic memory.
An episodic representation comprises multiple levels within a hierarchy across multiple cortical regions. Individual items (e.g. objects) are
represented in the perirhinal cortex (PRC), with individual features represented in feature-specific regions of the ventral visual stream (e.g. object
shape in the Lateral Occipital Complex (LOC)). Multiple items, such as objects and people, as well as the spatiotemporal context, are bound into a
coherent event representation in the posterior hippocampus (pHPC). Multiple events that take place within a broader episodic narrative are
associated in the anterior HPC (aHPC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Neurophysiological differences between these regions, in
relation to whether representations are coded in a distributed or sparse manner (PRC versus HPC), and the extent of neurogenesis and relative
size of subfields (in the posterior versus anterior HPC) are likely to drive distinct behavioural patterns of forgetting (e.g. rate and coherence) across
this hierarchy.
Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2021, 67:50–57 www.sciencedirect.com
Conflict of interest statement
Nothing declared.
Acknowledgements
We thank Prof Anna Schapiro for reading an earlier version of this
manuscript and Jamie Cockcroft for helpful feedback on the figures. Aidan J
Horner is supported by an ESRC grant (ES/R007454/1).
References and recommended reading
Papers of particular interest, published within the period of review,
have been highlighted as:
 of special interest
 of outstanding interest
1. Rubin DC, Wenzel AE: One hundred years of forgetting: a
quantitative description of retention. Psychol Rev 1996, 103:734
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.103.4.734.
2. Wixted JT: The psychology and neuroscience of forgetting.
Annu Rev Psychol 2004, 55:235-269 http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.psych.55.090902.141555.
3. Hardt O, Nader K, Nadel L: Decay happens: the role of active
forgetting in memory. Trends Cognit Sci 2013, 17:111-120 http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.01.001.
4.

Balaban H, Assaf D, Arad Meir M, Luria R: Different features of
real-world objects are represented in a dependent manner in
long-term memory. J Exp Psychol Gen 2020, 149:1275-1293
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000716.
This study investigated whether object representations remain coherent
over time. They found that when objects are forgotten, they are forgotten
completely and translate into random guesses rather than partial memory
for one object feature but not the other. They also showed that for the
small proportion of partial feature reports that were observed, retrieval
dependency differed as a function of object-feature. That is, retrieval of
lower-level features such as material or orientation was dependent on
retrieving the higher-order property of object exemplar (but not vice
versa). This suggests dependency may differ when object features are
represented in a hierarchy (as opposed to independently).
5.

Joensen BH, Gaskell MG, Horner AJ: United we fall: all-or-none
forgetting of complex episodic events. J Exp Psychol Gen 2020,
149:230-248 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000648.
The authors tested retrieval dependency for episodic events comprising
three elements (a person, an object, and a location) over time. Despite
decreases in accuracy, no evidence for decreases in dependency were
seen. This suggests that event-based representations are coherent and
tend to be forgotten in a uniform, holistic manner; an event is either
retrieved in its entirety or its elements are forgotten completely.
6.

Berens SC, Richards BA, Horner AJ: Dissociating memory
accessibility and precision in forgetting. Nat Hum Behav
2020:1-12 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-0888-8.
This registered report tested participants’ memory in terms of accessi-
bility and precision for word-location associations over time. They
showed that forgetting principally involved decreases in accessibility,
with no evidence for decreases in precision. This suggests that if a word-
location is retrieved successfully, it is remembered with as much preci-
sion as when it was first encoded. They also showed that clustering
semantically related words in a specific location led to increases in
accessibility, but decreases in precision, compared to when no clustering
was present.
7. McClelland JL, McNaughton BL, O’Reilly RC: Why there are
complementary learning systems in the hippocampus and
neocortex: insights from the successes and failures of
connectionist models of learning and memory. Psychol Rev
1995, 102:419 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.102.3.419.
8. Brainerd CJ, Reyna VF: Fuzzy-trace theory and false memory.
Curr Dir Psychol Sci 2002, 11:164-169 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/
1467-8721.00192.
9. Bussey TJ, Saksida LM: Memory, perception, and the ventral
visual-perirhinal-hippocampal stream: thinking outside of the
boxes. Hippocampus 2007, 17:898-908 http://dx.doi.org/
10.1002/hipo.20320.
10. Winocur G, Moscovitch M: Memory transformation and systems
consolidation. J Int Neuropsychol Soc 2011, 17:766-780 http://
dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1355617711000683.
11. Yassa MA, Reagh ZM: Competitive trace theory: a role for the
hippocampus in contextual interference during retrieval. Front
Behav Neurosci 2013, 7:107 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/
fnbeh.2013.00107.
12. Robin J, Moscovitch M: Details, gist and schema: hippocampal–
neocortical interactions underlying recent and remote
episodic and spatial memory. Curr Opin Behav Sci 2017, 17:114-
123 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2017.07.016.
13. Sekeres MJ, Winocur G, Moscovitch M: The hippocampus and
related neocortical structures in memory transformation.
Neurosci Lett 2018, 680:39-53 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
neulet.2018.05.006.
14. Ritchey M, Cooper RA: Deconstructing the posterior medial
episodic network. Trends Cognit Sci 2020, 24:451-465 http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2020.03.006.
15. Horner AJ, Burgess N: The associative structure of memory for
multi-element events. J Exp Psychol Gen 2013, 142:1370-1383
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0033626.
16. Horner AJ, Burgess N: Pattern completion in multielement
event engrams. Curr Biol 2014, 24:988-992 http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.cub.2014.03.012.
17.

Horner AJ, Bisby JA, Bush D, Lin WJ, Burgess N: Evidence for
holistic episodic recollection via hippocampal pattern
completion. Nat Commun 2015, 6:7462 http://dx.doi.org/
10.1038/ncomms8462.
This fMRI study demonstrated evidence for hippocampal pattern com-
pletion in humans in relation to the retrieval of complex episodic events.
They showed that location, person, object ‘events’ were reinstated in
neocortex in the presence of a partial cue, and that this reinstatement
correlated with the BOLD response in the hippocampus. This supports
the proposal that event representations are retrieved in the hippocampus
via pattern completion, and this retrieval drives subsequent reinstatement
of event elements in the neocortex.
18. Ngo CT, Horner AJ, Newcombe NS, Olson IR: Development of
holistic episodic recollection. Psychol Sci 2019, 30:1696-1706
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0956797619879441.
19. James E, Ong G, Henderson L, Horner AJ: Make or break it:
boundary conditions for integrating multiple elements in
episodic memory. PsyArXiv 2020 http://dx.doi.org/10.31234/osf.
io/pd9us.
20.

Brady TF, Konkle T, Alvarez GA, Oliva A: Real-world objects are
not represented as bound units: independent forgetting of
different object details from visual memory. J Exp Psychol Gen
2013, 142:791 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0029649.
This study was the first to investigate whether representations of objects
remain coherent over time. They found that different object features were
forgotten at different rates and retrieval dependency between different
object features decreased with delay, consistent with the fragmentation
of object representations. This suggests that objects may not be stored in
long-term memory as fully bound, integrated representations and that
different perceptual features (i.e. object colour and state) may be for-
gotten independently from one another.
21.

Utochkin IS, Brady TF: Independent storage of different
features of real-world objects in long-term memory. J Exp
Psychol Gen 2019, 149:530-549 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
xge0000664.
This study tested long-term recognition memory for specific feature
conjunctions of objects (e.g. two exemplars of a coffee mug in two
different states, empty or full). Participants remembered individual
object-features; however, they performed poorly when asked to match
two features (e.g. which mug was empty?). The finding that object
features can be retrieved independently but not together suggests that
object features may not be stored in a conjunctive object representation.
22.

Cooper RA, Ritchey M: Cortico-hippocampal network
connections support the multidimensional quality of episodic
memory. eLife 2019, 8:e45591 http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/
eLife.45591.001.
This fMRI study investigated the interactions between the hippocampus
and surrounding cortical networks as participants retrieved features (e.g.
colour, spatial context, and emotional tone) of episodic scenes using
Forgetting of episodic events Andermane, Joensen and Horner 55
www.sciencedirect.com Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2021, 67:50–57
continuous response options (e.g. adjusting the colour wheel for object
colour and the spatial context for the object location within the scene).
They observed retrieval dependency in relation to retrieving the gist of
features (i.e. accessibility) but the resolution with which each feature was
retrieved (i.e. precision) was independent. This study suggests that a
hippocampal event-based representation may not include precise infor-
mation about each perceptual feature, but instead only represent its gist-
like category.
23. Grill-Spector K, Kourtzi Z, Kanwisher N: The lateral occipital
complex and its role in object recognition. Vision Res 2001,
41:1409-1422 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0042-6989(01)
00073-6.
24. Diana RA, Yonelinas AP, Ranganath C: Imaging recollection and
familiarity in the medial temporal lobe: a three-component
model. Trends Cognit Sci 2007, 11:379-386 http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.tics.2007.08.001.
25. Staresina BP, Duncan KD, Davachi L: Perirhinal and
parahippocampal cortices differentially contribute to later
recollection of object-and scene-related event details. J
Neurosci 2011, 31:8739-8747 http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.4978-10.2011.
26. Erez J, Cusack R, Kendall W, Barense MD: Conjunctive coding of
complex object features. Cereb Cortex 2016, 26:2271-2282
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bhv081.
27. Martin CB, Douglas D, Newsome RN, Man LL, Barense MD:
Integrative and distinctive coding of visual and conceptual
object features in the ventral visual stream. eLife 2018, 7:
e31873 http://dx.doi.org/10.7554/eLife.31873.001.
28. Aggleton JP, Brown MW: Episodic memory, amnesia and the
hippocampal-anterior thalamic axis. Behav Brain Sci 1999,
22:425-444 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X99002034.
29. Davachi L, Mitchell JP, Wagner AD: Multiple routes to memory:
distinct medial temporal lobe processes build item and source
memories. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 2003, 100:2157-2162 http://
dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0337195100.
30. Eichenbaum H, Yonelinas AP, Ranganath C: The medial temporal
lobe and recognition memory. Annu Rev Neurosci 2007, 30:123-
152 http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.30.051606.094328.
31. Staresina BP, Cooper E, Henson RN: Reversible information
flow across the medial temporal lobe: the hippocampus links
cortical modules during memory retrieval. J Neurosci 2013,
33:14184-14192 http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1987-
13.2013.
32. Sadeh T, Ozubko JD, Winocur G, Moscovitch M: How we forget
may depend on how we remember. Trends Cognit Sci 2014,
18:26-36 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.10.008.
33. Cowell RA, Barense MD, Sadil PS: A roadmap for understanding
memory: decomposing cognitive processes into operations
and representations. eNeuro 2019, 6 http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/
ENEURO.0122-19.2019.
34.

Sadeh T, Ozubko JD, Winocur G, Moscovitch M: Forgetting
patterns differentiate between two forms of memory
representation. Psychol Sci 2016, 27:810-820 http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/0956797616638307.
The aim of this study was to dissociate between interference and
decay in forgetting and explore the influence of these processes on
familiar and recollected memories of words. They showed decreases
in familiarity as a function of interfering material (high versus low
interference), whereas recollection was unaffected by interfering
material. Recollection was shown to decrease as a function of time.
This suggests that the type of underlying memory representation (i.e.
recollection-based or familiarity-based) may determine the manner in
which it is forgotten.
35. Haxby JV, Gobbini MI, Furey ML, Ishai A, Schouten JL, Pietrini P:
Distributed and overlapping representations of faces and
objects in ventral temporal cortex. Science 2001, 293:2425-
2430 http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1063736.
36. O’Reilly RC, Norman KA: Hippocampal and neocortical
contributions to memory: advances in the complementary
learning systems framework. Trends Cognit Sci 2002, 6:505-510
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(02)02005-3.
37. Bakker A, Kirwan CB, Miller M, Stark CE: Pattern separation in
the human hippocampal CA3 and dentate gyrus. Science 2008,
319:1640-1642 http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1152882.
38. Yassa MA, Stark CE: Pattern separation in the hippocampus.
Trends Neurosci 2011, 34:515-525 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
tins.2011.06.006.
39. Berron D, Schu¨tze H, Maass A, Cardenas-Blanco A, Kuijf HJ,
Kumaran D, Du¨zel E: Strong evidence for pattern separation in
human dentate gyrus. J Neurosci 2016, 36:7569-7579 http://dx.
doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0518-16.2016.
40. Frankland PW, Ko¨hler S, Josselyn SA: Hippocampal
neurogenesis and forgetting. Trends Neurosci 2013, 36:497-503
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tins.2013.05.002.
41.

Sun SZ, Fidalgo C, Barense MD, Lee AC, Cant JS, Ferber S:
Erasing and blurring memories: the differential impact of
interference on separate aspects of forgetting. J Exp Psychol
Gen 2017, 146:1606 http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000359.
This study investigated how accessibility and precision decrease as a
function of interfering material in working memory (WM) for colour. They
showed that while participants could resist interference from highly
similar colours, material of intermediate similarity led to decreases in
memory precision (‘blurring’) of the encoded colour, whereas dissimilar
interfering material led to decreases in accessibility (‘erasure’). Thus,
patterns of forgetting in WM are dependent on the similarity of the
subsequently presented interfering material.
42. Reagh ZM, Yassa MA: Repetition strengthens target
recognition but impairs similar lure discrimination: evidence
for trace competition. Learn Mem 2014, 21:342-346 http://dx.
doi.org/10.1101/lm.034546.114.
43. Marr D: Simple memory: a theory for archicortex. Philos Trans R
Soc Lond Ser B 1971, 262:23-81.
44. Deuker L, Doeller C, Fell J, Axmacher N: Human neuroimaging
studies on the hippocampal CA3 region–integrating evidence
for pattern separation and completion. Front Cell Neurosci
2014, 8:64 http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fncel.2014.00064.
45. Grande X, Berron D, Horner AJ, Bisby JA, Du¨zel E, Burgess N:
Holistic recollection via pattern completion involves
hippocampal subfield CA3. J Neurosci 2019, 39:8100-8111
http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0722-19.2019.
46. Zotow E, Bisby JA, Burgess N: Behavioral evidence for pattern
separation in human episodic memory. Learn Mem 2020,
27:301-309 http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/lm.051821.120.
47.

Sekeres MJ, Bonasia K, St-Laurent M, Pishdadian S, Winocur G,
Grady C, Moscovitch M: Recovering and preventing loss of
detailed memory: differential rates of forgetting for detail
types in episodic memory. Learn Mem 2016, 23:72-82 http://dx.
doi.org/10.1101/lm.039057.115.
This study investigated forgetting for naturalistic stimuli (i.e. video clips of
films) over time. They showed that peripheral aspects (e.g. perceptual
detail) of an episode were forgotten more rapidly than central ones (e.g.
narrative detail). Additionally, participants consistently rated their memory
as stronger for the central than for the peripheral aspects. This suggests
different hierarchical levels of episodic representations exhibit distinct
patterns of forgetting, in terms of both objective memory performance
and subjective confidence.
48.

Fisher JS, Radvansky GA: Patterns of forgetting. J Mem Lang
2018, 102:130-141 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jml.2018.05.008.
This study investigated forgetting for written narratives across three
levels: (1) the verbatim words and syntax of a sentence (i.e. surface
form); (2) the propositional meaning of a sentence (i.e. textbase); (3) the
inferred meaning of the situation described in the narrative (i.e. event
model). They showed that event model memory decreased initially but
then plateaued over time, whereas memory for the textbase decreased
gradually with a sharp drop at 7 days. Surface form memory showed the
most rapid decline but did not reach chance level at any point. This study
highlights the hierarchical structure of memories for narratives and
suggests a distinct pattern of forgetting for each level of the
representation.
49. Van Kesteren MT, Ruiter DJ, Ferna´ndez G, Henson RN: How
schema and novelty augment memory formation. Trends
Neurosci 2012, 35:211-219 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
tins.2012.02.001.
56 Neurobiology of learning and plasticity
Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2021, 67:50–57 www.sciencedirect.com
50. Preston AR, Eichenbaum H: Interplay of hippocampus and
prefrontal cortex in memory. Curr Biol 2013, 23:R764-R773
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2013.05.041.
51. McCormick C, Ciaramelli E, De Luca F, Maguire EA: Comparing
and contrasting the cognitive effects of hippocampal and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage: a review of human
lesion studies. Neuroscience 2018, 374:295-318 http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2017.07.066.
52. Barry DN, Maguire EA: Remote memory and the hippocampus:
a constructive critique. Trends Cognit Sci 2019, 23:128-142
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2018.11.005.
53. Schmalhofer F, Glavanov D: Three components of
understanding a programmer’s manual: verbatim,
propositional, and situational representations. J Mem Lang
1986, 25:279-294 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0749-596X(86)
90002-1.
54. Kintsch W, Welsch D, Schmalhofer F, Zimny S: Sentence
memory: a theoretical analysis. J Mem Lang 1990, 29:133-159
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0749-596X(90)90069-C.
55. Radvansky GA, Zwaan RA, Curiel JM, Copeland DE: Situation
models and aging. Psychol Aging 2001, 16:145 http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/0882-7974.16.1.145.
56. Poppenk J, Evensmoen HR, Moscovitch M, Nadel L: Long-axis
specialization of the human hippocampus. Trends Cognit Sci
2013, 17:230-240 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2013.03.005.
57.

Collin SH, Milivojevic B, Doeller CF: Memory hierarchies map
onto the hippocampal long axis in humans. Nat Neurosci 2015,
18:1562 http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nn.4138.
This study investigated the role of the HPC long axis in representing
episodes of different complexity using video clips of animated life-like
events and fMRI multivoxel pattern analysis (i.e. representational simi-
larity analysis). The authors found that simple pairwise event associations
were represented in posterior regions, whereas more complex inferred
associations between several events were represented in anterior HPC.
Their results suggest episodes vary in the resolution in which they are
represented, from single spatiotemporal contexts to broader narratives
linking several events. Critically, the long axis of HPC appears to track this
episodic resolution, with posterior regions representing smaller event
networks, middle regions representing medium-scale networks compris-
ing several event associations, and anterior regions tracking complex
narratives involving several events including inferences about how the
events may be linked.
58. Ritchey M, Libby LA, Ranganath C: Cortico-hippocampal
systems involved in memory and cognition: the PMAT
framework. Progress in Brain Research. Elsevier; 2015:45-64
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/bs.pbr.2015.04.001.
59. Malykhin NV, Lebel RM, Coupland NJ, Wilman AH, Carter R: In
vivo quantification of hippocampal subfields using 4.7 T fast
spin echo imaging. Neuroimage 2010, 49:1224-1230 http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.09.042.
60. Snyder JS, Ferrante SC, Cameron HA: Late maturation of adult-
born neurons in the temporal dentate gyrus. PLoS One 2012, 7:
e48757 http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0048757.
61. Andermane N, Bowers JS: Detailed and gist-like visual
memories are forgotten at similar rates over the course of a
week. Psychon Bull Rev 2015, 22:1358-1363 http://dx.doi.org/
10.3758/s13423-015-0800-0.
62. Ahmad FN, Moscovitch M, Hockley WE: Effects of varying
presentation time on long-term recognition memory for
scenes: verbatim and gist representations. Mem Cognit 2017,
45:390-403 http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/s13421-016-0672-1.
Forgetting of episodic events Andermane, Joensen and Horner 57
www.sciencedirect.com Current Opinion in Neurobiology 2021, 67:50–57
